"Good proofs are proofs that make us wiser."
Interview with Yuri I. Manin 1
by Martin Aigner and Vasco A. Schmidt
The Intern a tional Congress of Mathe matic ia n s is a pproaching a nd so is the n e xt ce nt ury. Do you think a Hilbe rt is still possible t o d ay? Are the r e any conte mporary proble m s corresponding to Hilbe rt 's Proble m s?
I do not actually believe t hat Hilbert 's Iist had a great role in the mathematics of t his cent ury. It certainly was psychologically important for many mathematicians. For example Arnold told t hat while being a young graduate student he had copied t he list of Hilbert's problems in his notebook and always kept it with him. But when Gelfand learnt about that , he actually mocked Arnold on this. Arnold saw problern solving as an essent ial part of great mathematical achievements. For me it 's different. I see t he process of mathematical creation as a kind of recognizing a preexisting pattern. When you study something -topology, probability, number t heory, whatever -fi rst you acquire a general vision of t he vast territory, t hen you focus on a part of it. Later you t ry to recognize "what is there?" and "what has already been seen by other people?" . So you can read other papers and finally start discerning something nobody has seen before you. When I was very young I was extremely interested in t he fact t hat Gauß fo und seven or eight proofs of t he quadratic reciprocity law. What botbered me was why he needed 1 Max-Planck Institute fo r Mathe mat ics, Sonn , Ger many 40 seven or eight proofs. Every t ime I gained some more understanding of number t heory I better understood Gauß ' mind . Of course he was not looking for more convincing arguments -one proof is sufficiently convincing. The point is, t hat proving is t he way we are discovering new territories, new feat ures of t he mathematical landscape. Any proof is a way to get from one place to another place: when you go different ways you see different t hings.
I s the e mphasis on proble rn solving a kind of romantic view: a gr eat h e ro who conque r s the mounta in?
Yes, somehow a kind of sport ive view . I don't say it is irrelevant. It is quite important for young persons, as a psychological device to lure young people to create some social recognit ion for great achievements. A good problern is an embodiment of a vision of a great mathematical mind , which could not see t he ways leading to some height but which recognized t hat there is a mountain. But it is not t he way to see mathematics, nor t he way t o present mathematics to a general public. And it is not the essence. Especially when such problems are put in a list, it is something like a Iist of capitals of great countries of the world : it conveys t he minimal possible information at all. I do not actually believe t hat Hilbert t hought this is the way to organize mathematics.
Would you ve nture to pre dict some dominant patte rns of mathe matics in the n ext century? This is very difficult. I t hink t he mathematics of t he 20t h cent ury is best presented ara und programs, not problems. Sometimes t hey are explicit ly formulated , sometimes t hey are gradually ernerging as a prevailing tendency. For example t he development of mathematical logic and t he foundations of mathematics. That was certainly a development of a program which was understood as such. After Cantor 's discoveries it was clear t hat we have to consider very deeply t he ways we t hink about infinity. Or we have Langlands' program of understanding t he Galois group by looking at t he representations of t he Galois and automorphic forms. There is one program wit h which we enter t he next cent ury. T his program can be t hought of as the quant ization of mathematics. When one Iooks at how many mathematical notions cha nged
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in t he last twenty years in a way that t he new notions are quant um versions of the old ones -it is amazing: Look at quant um groups, quant um cohomology, quant um comput ing -and I t hink many more are ahead of us. This is very strange because nobody actually conceived anything like that as a program fo r developing mathematics in general. The desire was just to understand the mathematical tools t hat physicists invented wit h phantastic int ui t ion and which they used in a very stimulating but somewhat careless way from t he point of view of a pure mathematician.
How do you think the 20th century will be looked at from a historical point of view. Was it an important century? I t hink so. Mathematics of t his cent ury succeeded in harmonizing and unifying diverse fields on a scale probably never seen before. The most prominent roJe in t his unification was played by set t heory. Init ially conceived by Cantor as a new chapter of mathematics. "t he t heory of infinity", set t heory, gradually changed its status and developed into t he universal m athematical language. It was understood t hat starting wit h a rather short Iist of basic terms and operations, one could generate recursively t he linguistic constructions which apparent ly conveyed equally weil t he int uit ion of t he founding fathers of calculus, probability, number t heory, topology, different ial geometry and what not . Thus the whole mathematical community acquired a common idiom. Moreover , allowing t he clear distinction between t he set-t heoretic and geometric content of the mathematical constructions on the one hand , and their flexible linguistic expression (notation , formulas, calculat ion) on t he other , set theory greatly simplified t he interaction between t he right and left brains of every working mathematician as an individual. This twofold function of t he set-theoretic language became the basis for the development of new technical tools, for t he solut ion of old problems as weil as the formulation of research programs. The diversification of mathematics was connect ed first of all wit h external social phenomena : t he rapid growth of the scientific
community in general and t he groundbreaking discoveries in physics.
In my opinion , t he mathematics of t he last hundred years did not produce anything comparable to quant um t heory or general relativity in terms of t he result ing change of our total world percept ion. But I do believe that without t he mathematical language physicists could n't even say what they were seeing. T his interrelation between physical discoveries and mathematical ways of t hinking, t he mathematical language, in which these discoveries can only be expressed , is absolutely phantastic. In t his sense t he 20t h cent ury certainly will be regarded as a century of great breakt hroughs.
Are there certain specific topics that come to your mind, in which our century was really at a top Ievel?
In t he 18th and 19t h cent ury mathematicallanguage was much vaguer t han we are accustomed to. I think the 20t h cent ury started wit h rethinking t he basics. When t he basics were clear enough t here was a great sem·ch of technical methods of incredible strength which led to t he creation of powerful tools allowing us to develop and expand our geometric intui t ion to new domains. I have in mind topology, homological algebra and algebraic geometry. As soon as t he technical development was accomplished , t he solut ion of several very difficult problems fell into t he span of thirty years -Deligne's proof of t he Weil conj ectures, Faltings' proof of the Mordeil conjecture, Wiles ' proof of Fermat. All of t hem could not have been done in t he last century just because mathematics was not developed enough.
Some people -some of them mathematicians -proclaim the end of proof, partly in view of the universal availability of computers. How would you comment on this?
If you are sp eaking of mathematics wit hout proofs you are speaking of something int rinsically contradictory. The proof cannot die -only together wit h mathematics. But mathematics can die as an accepted part of t he cult ure of humanity. I think , in our generation , mathematicians still keep doing mathematics as we unterstand it . Proofs are t he only way we know the t rut h of our t houghts; t hat is actually t he only way of describing what we have seen. Proof is not just an argument convincing an imaginary Opponent . Not at all. Proof is the way we communicate mathematical t rut h. Everything else -leaps of intuition , elation of sudden discovery, ungrounded but strong beliefs, remains our private matter. And when we do some computer calculations we are only proving t hat in the set of cases we have checked the things are as we have seen t hem. J ust recently there was a note in the newspaper that a computer has proved a conjecture of Herbert Robbins by carrying out a full search of all possible strategies.
Of course this is possible. Why not? If you have invented a good strategy of proof which includes however an extensive search or long formal calculations, and afterwards you have written a program implementing this sem·ch, it's perfectly OK. But computer assisted proofs, as well as computer unassisted ones, can be good or bad. A good proof is a proof that makes us wiser. If the heart of the proof is a voluminious sem·ch or a long string of identities, it is probably a bad proof. If something is so isolated that it is sufficient to get the result popped up on the screen or a computer, then it is probably not worth doing. If I have to calculate the first 20 digits of 1r by hand I certainly become wiser afterwards because I see that these formulas for 1r that I knew take too much t ime to produce 20 digits. So I dig up something that I didn't know. I will probably devise some algorithms which minimize my effort. I certainly become wiser. But when I get two millions of digits of 1r from the computer using somebody else's library program I remain as stupid as I was before.
If you have a beautiful theorem with an equally beautiful proof but which needs the calculation of one thousand cases, do you mind giving it away to the computer? Is this a bona fide proof?
It will be a bona fide proof with the same reservations as I would have for any proof written on paper.
There can be possible mistakes in the programming, there can be possible mistakes in implementing the calculation and finally there can be possible mistakes in our understanding of how to classify all the cases and so on. We have examples for those proofs. We have the Four-Color-Problem and the classification of simple groups. In both cases a huge amount of combinatorial material was partly t reated by computer calculation. So, there is still room for doubts and the need to recheck the calculations, but most important, to devise ways for seeing things in a new light.
Let me ask you a question about mathematics internally. In recent years the mathemat-42 ical community seems to emphazise applications. Do you think that pure mathematics will have problems, as compared to applied mathematics? Do you have the impression that the money will go in the future only to those fields?
Applications ask for and get much more money than pure mathematics. But I don 't think it 's actually the problem of money in terms of allocating limited resources. Mathematicians don't need and don 't spend much money. It 's a problern of the public attention and the public scale of values. I see the growing estrangement of our society from the traditional Enlightenment values, and the public just does not want to spend on mathematics, probably on universities in general. Mathematics -if it will be a victim -will be a victim of this general process, not of the fact that money goes to applications. But, surely, I do t hink that t here will be a continuous shift to applicat ions in terms of t he quantitative resources allocated to applications, and the attractiveness of this kind of occupation for young persons. Applied mathematics is connected with computer simulation -computers at large, databases, programs and things like that. I have once translated a talk by Donald Knuth into Russian. In Usbekistan there was a meeting dedicated to Al 'khorezmi. Knuth started his talk with a funny statement. In his opinion the primary importance of computers for the mathematical community is that those people finally took to mathematics who were interested in mathematics but had a algorithmic sort of mind. ow they were able to do what they wanted. Before that, this subculture didn 't exist . And Knuth was describing himself as a person whose mind is specifically designed for writing software and how happy he was that, finally, he could do what he wanted to. I take this argument quite seriously and I do believe that among the community of future potential mathematicians there is a subcommunity whose minds are better for writing computer programs t han for proving theorems. In the last century they probably would have proved theorems but nowadays they do not. I have a great suspicion that for example Euler today would spend much more of histime on writing software because he sperrt so much of his t ime, e.g. , in efforts of calculating tables of moon positions. And I believe that Gauß as well would spend much more time sitting in front of the screen.
Let us go back to the question of applied mathematics. Isn't it true that mathematics is often successful but that the computer science people receive most of the credit? A standard example is computer tomography. No one I ever talked to had ever heard of the Radon
tra n sform , the core of compute r tomography. E ven educate d p e ople think tha t this is exclus ive ly the work of compute r scie ntist s .
T he point is that t here is an inherent weakness in t rying to justify one's concerns by saying t hat they are useful. Useful is a word of engineering. Whatever you understand of quantum mechanics ( or chips or whatever), it is only underst anding of formulas on a piece of paper. There is nothing useful about it . It becomes useful if it is implemented in things, and if . it becomes engineered .
In my opinion, the basis of all human culture is language, and m athematics is a special kind of linguistic activity.
Should the mathe maticians go on the offe ns ive ? Should they st e p out into the world and sa y " h e r e we are"? Are we too r e luctant to advertize our a chie ve m e nts ?
I strongly argue for being reluctant. I am a rather reclusive person and I hate imposing my views on t he public. I t hink whatever is good will come out a nyway, alt hough there is a generalproblern of selling cult ure -assuming that we are producing something of cult ural value. It is up to the public to pay for it or not to pay for it. Of course, some of us probably must try to prove t hat t hey are important, but I think it is difficult. What do you think is the cultural role of mathe m a tics ?
In my opinion , t he basis of all human cult ure is language, and mathematics is a special kind of linguistic act ivity. atural la nguage is an extremely flexible tool of communicating essentials required for survival, of expressing one's emotions and enforcing one's will, of creating virt ual worlds of poetry and religion , of seduction and conviction. However , natural language is not very weil fi t for acquiring, organizing and keeping our growing understanding of nature, which is t he most characteristic t rait of t he modern civilization. Aristotle was arguably t he last great mind t hat stretched t his capability of language to its Iimits. W it h t he advent of Galileo, Kepler and Newton, t he natura l language in sciences was relegated t o the role of a high Ievel mediator between t he actual scientific knowledge encoded in astronomical tables, chemical formulas, equations of quant um field t heory, dat abases of human genome on t he one hand, and our brains on the other hand. Using the natural language in studying and teaching sciences, we bring wit h it our values and prejudices, poetical imagery, passion for power and trickster 's skills, but nothing really essential for the content of t he scient ific discourse. Everything t hat is essent ial is carried eit her by long lists of more or less weil structured data, or by mathem atics. And mathematics, which is init ially used in order t o better describe the structure of t he dat a, gradually compresses t hem to such a degree t hat we st art speaking about the "laws of nature", generating and explaining the infinite variety of phenomena. In addit ion, in the process of its internal development and prompted by its inner logic, mathematics creates virtual worlds of great complexity and internal beauty which defy any attempt of describing t hem in na turallanguage but challenge t he imaginat ion of a handful of professionals in many successive generations. For t his reason I believe that mathematics is one of the most remarkable achievements of cult ure, and my life-long preoccupation wit h mathemat ics in the capacity of researcher and teacher still leaves me wit h awe and admiration by t he end of every working day. However , I do not believe t hat I can convincingly defend t his conviction in the context of contemporary public debate on science and human values.
Why are you so pessimistic? I will start explaining my pessimism by reminding that in the current usage "culture" became a profoundly self-referential word. Namely, it is taken for granted that any definition of culture is determined by t he pre-existing cultural background, even if the latter is not made explicit. This means that no objective account and evaluation of culture is possible. Furthermore, any Statement about culture that becomes aut horitative changes the public image of culture and thus changes the culture itself. And any collective discussion referring to culture somehow becomes part of the culture. Most importantly, the modern discourse on cult ure is largely subordinate to the poli tical discourse. We were less aware of all this when four decades ago, C. P. Snow launched the discussion of ·'the two cultures" . Basically, Snow was worried by t he fact that in his milieu the scientific knowledge was not considered as an organic part of the education of a cultured person , as opposed to the Greeks and Shakespeare. Moreover, one could openly and even boastfully acknowledge his or her ignorance of basic laws of physics without damaging his or her image as a cultured person. Snow saw this as a result of the distorted public perception of what constituted the actual content of cult ure and hoped that public debate and reformed education could help to restore the balance.
Is the thesis of the two cultures still relevant?
The relevance of his observation for us depends on our ability to identify ourselves with respect to his idealized Culture with capital C, embracing Homer and Bach , Galileo and Shakespeare, Tolstoy and Einstein. I am afraid that this ability is largely lost . In fact, the popular idea of multiculturalism creates the image of many equally valid cultures each of which is assigned to a minority and basically coincides with t he definition of that minority. Grand culture of European origin and/or cultivation is put on a par with other regional cultures and is diminished in stature by such pejorative connotations as cultural imperialism and Eurocentrism. Environmentalists blame sciences and technology for the destructive uses we made of them, thus further diminishing their cultural appeal. Ironically, the same arguments that 44 scientists employed in order to just ify t heir occupation are now turned against them. Deconstructionist and postmodern trends of discourse put in doubt the basic criteria of recognizing the scientific truth going back at least to Galileo and Bacon, and try to replace them by wildly arbitrary intellectual construct ions. In this way many of the influential t hinkers do not just ignore but aggressively dismiss the scientific counterpart of the contemporary culture. I may (as I do) find this situation deplorable, but I cannot realistically count on an essentia l improvement in the foreseable future. In fact, all factors contributing to it are of rather recent origin and hardly willlose t heir momentum soon. P aradoxically, the self-denigrating stand of contemporary Western culture is a logical continuation of the development of its liberal values to which Enlightenment and sciences contributed so crucially. In these conditions it is only natural that any discussion of the cultural role of mathematics is bound to be irrelevant for everybody, except for the minority of mathematicians.
Coming back to the future of mathematics. Do you personally have a theory for which you say: "I would like to see it developed in the next century -if I live long enough, this is what I would like to see."
This I do not know for the following reason: During my scientific career I have changed my subj ects several times and not so much because I found something more interesting than something else. Basically I find everything very interesting, but there is no possibility to do everything at the same t ime. The second best strategy is to try mastering several fields in turn. Two main things I was always interested in were number theory on the one hand and physics on the other. So I think in both domains I always tried to use t he intuit ion developed in both domains. Understanding problems in number theory helped me to understand problems in physics and vice versa. On my private list of values a place of honor is held by the Renaissance term "varietft" -richness of life and world matched with variety of experience and thought, achieved by great minds which we try to emulate.
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